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EDITOR’S NOTE
The Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is assumed to have had at 
least three significant and lasting consequences. First, it brought to a 
close the most horrid of the bloodletting between the two great camps 
of Western Christianity—the Catholic and Protestant faithful. Second, 
the Treaty underscored the rise of the nation-state, which was marked 
by the supersession of procedures of political rule over ecclesiastical 
authority. Third, the primacy of the nation-state, in turn, opened up 
nationalist fervor and fierce competition for glory to such an extent 
that international transactions were considered to be at the mercy of a 
chaotic and dangerous political environment. In time, the latter, in an 
appropriation of a particular rendition of Nicolo Machiavelli’s proposi-
tions in The Prince, crystallized into a dominant paradigm that popu-
larly came to be known as “Realism.”1 The fundamental postulate of 
realism was, and still is, this: Given the absence of a supreme sovereign 
and, therefore, the lawless nature of the world, a nation-state should 
premise its approach on seeing all alliances as soft and held together 
by a temporary convergence of interests. As a result, a nation-state that 
aspires not only to survive but to flourish in such an unreliable, if not 
deadly, context ought to marshal its military, economic, political, and 
other resources and bring that strength to bear as situations demand.
Not surprisingly, the acceleration of the competitive drive among 
the nation-states immediately ignited a frenzied debate about war and 
peace that continues in our day. In an age closer to our own than the 
ancient or medieval periods, and with the clamor over national inter-
ests rising to an aggressive crescendo, two voices articulated different 
perspectives that are equally at home in contemporary discussions 
over the nature of international affairs. In what has become a famous 
and classical intervention, Immanuel Kant made the case for the imper-
atives of cosmopolitan belonging or a universal community:
The alien…may request the right to be a permanent visitor (and it would 
require a special charitable agreement to make him/her a fellow inhabit-
ant for a certain period), but the right to visit, to associate, belongs to 
all humans by virtue of their common ownership of the earth’s surface; 
for since the earth is a globe, they cannot scatter indefinitely, but must, 
finally, tolerate living in close proximity.2
xi
Kant’s cosmic call was counterposed by another German thinker, 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Stressing the unavoidability of realpolitik, he 
proffered that the primary aim was “to unite the politics of interna-
tional power and internal dictatorship, after the world is conquered by 
a single sovereign, the only means of ensuring peace.”3 That those dif-
fering interpretations and axiologies were not limited to isolated indi-
vidual thinkers is abundantly testified by the numerous wars between 
nation-states, the rise and fall of modern empires, decolonization, and 
the various attempts to structure the affairs of the world through the 
cultivation of supra-subjectivities and their correlate institutions. In 
addition to attempts at the level of regions, examples of the latter 
efforts include the League of Nations and the United Nations Organi-
zation. Currently, these older concerns are complicated by the end of 
the Cold War and the onset of the latest versions of globalization.4
The birth of the United States of America, its evolution, rise to global 
power, and contemporary dominance of the world stage are at once 
intertwined with the history of the rest of the world and the render-
ings that accompany each phase. For instance, in its inception, some 
deemed the United States as the antithesis of both a Europe, simultane-
ously burdened with repressive local structures and habits and endless 
quarrels that often ushered in destructive wars, and other, more alien, 
zones shrouded in “primitive” cultures. Subsequently, the American 
Declaration of Independence and constitutionalism were thrust forth 
and sanctified as unparalleled achievements to be emulated by a soci-
ety ambitious enough to cross into the millennium of beckoning free-
dom and economic prosperity. More specifically, deep-shadowing of 
its brutal domestic contradictions notwithstanding,5 this sense of the 
American collective identity was increasingly wedded to a religious 
(particularly Protestant) conviction—one that stipulated that the rest 
of the world ought to be awakened to this newly found path to mod-
ernization. Here lies the origin of a complex fusion of what becomes, 
in Anatole Lienen’s apt term, the “American Thesis.” At the heart of 
this belief is, on the one hand, a preference to keep America’s distance 
from the contagions of the afflicted and, on the other, a contradictory 
propensity to want to turn others into a replica of self.
American culture historically has embodied a strong strain of isolation-
ism. This isolationism is, however, a complex phenomenon which should 
not be understood simply as a desire to withdraw from the world. Rather, 
American isolationism forms another face of both American chauvinism 
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and American Messianism, in the form of a belief in America as a unique 
city on a hill. As a result, it is closely related to nationalist unilateralism 
in international affairs, since it forms part of a view that if the United 
States really has no choice at all but to involve itself with disgusting 
and inferior foreigners, it must absolutely control the process and must 
under no circumstances subject itself to foreign control or even advice.6
An assumed triumph of America’s values over the “alternative” that 
had culminated in the conclusion of the Cold War reinforced national 
self-righteousness, with overconfidence in the country’s “unique” place 
in the design of the future. Then the shocking events of September 11, 
2001, took place. The immediate impact on the consciousness of the 
American people and policymakers was, to say the least, so startling 
that a new and contumacious debate started.7 On one side were those 
who had articulated a grim vision of the post-Cold War time—one, 
they say, in which an unmistakable Manichean line has been drawn 
that separates a virtuous United States from a demonic Islamic terror-
ist network, with supporting states hateful of individual liberty, market 
economy, and technological progress.8 Reviving the “American Creed,” 
these commentators and their policy-making cohorts within the Bush 
Administration set the basis for the quick production of the National 
Security Strategy of 2002.9 As the discourse revolved around how best 
the United States might engage the rest of the world, this perspective 
stressed the necessity of beefing up and subsequently using American 
strength. “In deploying American power,” urges Max Boot, “decision 
makers should be less apologetic, less hesitant, less humble.”10 Further-
more, this advocacy for the bold use of overwhelming might simulta-
neously made the case for an unquestionable rectitude of American 
hegemony over the rest of the world. Put differently, it is said that an 
empire of the American type was a much needed antidote in the face 
of an ascending and violent disorder.11 Naturally, such a drumbeating 
for unilateralism generated at least two, though somewhat different, 
dissenting voices.12 One belongs to those who, while supportive of 
American supremacy in world affairs, advocate a multilateral strategy 
that still leaves plenty of room for the defense of the national interest. 
Joseph Nye conceptualizes this tack as a result of an intelligent mix of 
“hard” and “soft” power.13 By far the most formidable reaction to the 
unilateralist and imperialist sentiments comes in two guises. The first 
is an epistemological-cum-ethical challenge to those whose writings 
propagate new imperial interventions, particularly in the global South, 
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as positive acts to assuage threatening turbulence. Such convulsions 
are often ascribed to the harrowing conditions caused by bust up states 
and the liabilities inherent in those societies. In an incisive response to 
Michael Ignatieff’s dismissal of the horrid legacies of earlier imperial-
ism so as to create legitimacy for the new versions, Rahul Rao asserts:
When Western academics express impatience at imputations of historical 
responsibility for colonialism, they in effect arbitrarily impose a statute 
of limitations on discussion of old empire, even as others in the acad-
emy…open new chapters in this evolving story. The convergence of this 
whitewashing of old imperialism, limitations of its moral responsibility 
and advocacy of new imperialism has fueled a profoundly disturbing 
renewal of enthusiasm for empire in the Western academy today.14
The other response emanates from the combined contributions of a 
cluster of scholars.15 They point to the folly of empire, America’s more 
than 725 overseas military bases and other kinds of power notwith-
standing. Here, an emphasis is put upon what is taken to be a deep 
corrosion of domestic civil liberties and economic well-being, alien-
ation of traditional allies, and insecurities that inevitably accompany 
the hijacking and perversion of other peoples’ histories as well as the 
consequent frustration of their aspirations in the more transparent age 
of technological globalization.
In the end, as American hyperpower plays itself out in the world 
arena and in intimate encounters with other societies, all buffeted by 
the gale winds of the epoch, the debate over the United States’ role 
would only intensify in the coming years. At the core of that conversa-
tion is the nature of the relationship between the United States (and, to 
a lesser extent, the European Union in-progress) with the vast universe 
of the global South. This singling out of the United States is appropri-
ate, given the fact that it will be at the center of global power for a 
significant part of this new century. To construct a mutually enabling 
dialogue and concrete interactions seems, at first blush and seduc-
tively, as relatively simple as a matter of mere communication. Alas, it 
is more daunting to such an extent that one could identify the challenge 
as the most difficult of all the tasks that confront the current human 
civilization. Seen in its full scope and ramifications returns us, then, to 
the clairvoyance of Kant. A contemporary version of that universalist 
imperative has been cogently expressed by Susan Buck-Morss:
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In the global sphere, tolerance is the first criteria; we cannot be placed 
on the defensive because of who we are. Freedom to dissent is the sec-
ond; we need to be able to criticize power that is inhuman in its effects, 
regardless of those who exercise it. The third criterion defines the goal 
to trust each other politically and act together, even when the languages 
in which we speak our moral concerns not only differ, but seem to be in 
open contradiction… . What is needed is to rethink the entire project of 
politics within the changed conditions of a global public sphere—and do 
this democratically, as people who speak different political languages, 
but whose goals are nonetheless the same: global peace, economic jus-
tice, legal equality, democratic participation, individual freedom, mutual 
respect.16
With these most crucial issues at stake, a blunt but respectful discus-
sion of America’s interaction with the world, and from variable per-
spectives, seems an appropriate place to begin.
*****
We start the Roundtable with the opening essay by Niall Ferguson. 
His thrust confirms the United States as a global empire indispensable 
for an age in need of order, “the necessary precondition for liberty.” 
However, he argues, this will not be easy because a successful imperial 
leadership requires competent management of the resources at home 
and intelligent understanding of the world.
The second session is set around Tariq Ali’s fierce challenge to both 
the arguments put forth by Ferguson and what he sees as arrogant 
and aggressive but untenable foreign policies of the United States. 
Anna Kläppe agrees with much of Ali’s perspective but chides him 
for underselling the necessity of creating effective multilateral organi-
zations—including strengthening the United Nations. Mark Davis is 
appreciative of Ali’s capacity to historicize America’s current policies 
and concurs with Ali’s characterization of U.S. foreign policy-making 
as often ill conceived and myopic. Nonetheless, Davis asks for more 
judicious and new ideas that could bring relief to those societies caught 
up in the grip of “failing states” or brutal dictatorships.
The third conversation is organized around Michael Ledeen’s essay. 
His meditations reaffirm the school of thought that has seen the U.S.A. 
as a totally “different kind of country.” He asserts that the struggle 
against terror is a new phenomenon imposed on the United States 
with the events of September 11, 2001. In that context, he bluntly calls 
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for a “regime challenge” across the Middle East, with the exception of 
Israel, and particularly in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Jesse Uggla agrees with the point that the United States has some 
unique characteristics. Moreover, he is sympathetic to the argument 
that American leadership has “mismanaged” the response to terror-
ism. But Uggla contests the wisdom of using American military force 
and, instead, advocates an imaginative use of “soft power.” Emily 
Rosenberg’s bold intervention takes Ledeen to task on multiple and 
critical points. From interpretation of the history of American foreign 
relations to Ledeen’s recommended policy towards Iran, Rosenberg 
offers a powerful counter-narrative as well as sounds the alarm over 
the menace of “imperial hubris.”
*****
The upcoming twelfth annual Macalester International Roundtable 
partakes of the 400th Anniversary of the appearance of Don Quixote. 
The theme will be “Quixotic Offspring: The Global Legacy of Don 
Quixote.”
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